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REFLECTIONS REGARDING PLACE OF DAMAGE 
IN RELATION TO KEYWORD ADVERTISING 
by
ULF MAUNSBACH*
This paper starts out with an analysis of the Google-case (C-236/08 to C-238/08),  
in  order  to  illustrate  how trademarks  are  being used in new technical  environ-
ments. In the case the ECJ is answering questions both in relation to use of trade-
marks on the Internet and in relation to the responsibilities among the actors in-
volved. It is illustrated that the ECJ is showing and understanding in relation to  
the fact that the Internet may have to be treated with special attention being paid to  
the distinguishing features of the information society and that information techno-
logy occasionally demands new approaches. Moreover the Google-case is being used  
to illustrate a new development with an increased number of cross-border infringe-
ments, which brings up questions regarding jurisdiction and choice of law. In this  
context it will be discussed whether or not the time has come for vacating the abso-
lute perception that intellectual property rights exclusively have to be treated by  
courts in the protecting country applying the law of the country in which the right  
is protected. In the paper arguments in favor of a more flexible system are high-
lighted and discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On March 23rd 2010 came the much awaited ECJ decision in the Google-
case (C-236/08 to C-238/08). The case concerns the use of trademarks on the 
Internet or more specifically the practice of “keyword advertising”. This is 
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an area of law that is and will be of immediate relevance since it puts focus 
on legal questions that appears in relation to new technology and new so-
cial patterns. The Google-case is not the only case underlining this develop-
ment.  During  2010 two additional  cases  have been  decided  by  the  ECJ, 
BergSpechte  (C-278/08)  and  Portakabin  (C-558/08).  In  addition  there  are 
cases pending before the ECJ (e.g. C-323/09 and C-324/09), which in differ-
ent ways relate to the use of trademarks on the Internet.
The purpose of this paper is two folded. First I would like to present the 
findings in the Google-case and its followers. That includes a short present-
ation  of  the  technical  framework  and  the  legal  background.  Secondly  I 
would like to start a discussion in relation to the AdWords service (and sim-
ilar  services)  since this  type of technical  advertising service  gives rise  to 
more questions than are actually addressed by the ECJ.
2. TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK AND FACTS IN THE NATIONAL 
COURTS
The facts in the Google-case are, to put it simple, as follows. Google oper-
ates an Internet search engine which is widely used by the Internet com-
munity. When committing a search the search engine will display the sites 
which appear best to correspond to the search words chosen. This result of 
the search is referred to as the “natural” results. In addition, Google offers a 
paid referencing service called “AdWords”. That service can be used by the 
advertisers, by means of the reservation of one or more keywords, in order 
to obtain a link between the keyword and the advertisement. When an In-
ternet user is typing the keyword in the search engine the ad will appear 
under  the  heading  “sponsored  links”,  which  is  displayed  either  on  the 
right-hand side of the screen, to the right of the natural results, or on the up-
per part of the screen, above the natural results.
It is possible for several advertisers to reserve the same keywords and 
the advertisement will be displayed, among other things, in relation to the 
price paid for the advertisement. AdWords makes it possible for advertisers 
to construct their advertisement and place it within the AdWords service 
without any additional support from Google. In general the whole system 
makes it possible to tailor advertisement that is not possible in the “real” 
world, something that must be regarded as an advantage for advertiser as 
well as consumers. If you sell computers it is rational to link your advertise-
ment to the search word “computer” and for the user it is likely that advert-
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isement for computers will be of interest if you are searching for informa-
tion about computers. In other words a perfect win-win situation. However, 
problems  may  appear  when  advertisers  are  reserving  keywords  corres-
ponding to the names of competitors or when pirates and plagiarists are re-
serving keywords corresponding to the original brands. That is the situation 
in the Google-case, which is actually a joint case comprising questions re-
ferred in three different national proceedings. A combining factor is that all 
cases concern the use of AdWords and that they all emanated from France 
and the Court of Cassation.
The first  case (C-236/08) deals with the use of the well  known trade-
marks “Louis Vuitton” and “LV”. Both are to be considered as trademarks 
with  a reputation.  Vuitton noticed  that  its  trademark was being  used as 
keywords  for  advertisement  of  websites  offering  imitations  of  Vuitton’s 
products.  In deed there was advertisement in relation to Vuitton’s trade-
marks combined with words such as imitation and copy. Vuitton brought 
proceeding  against  Google  for  trademark  infringement  and  Google  was 
found guilty by a judgment of 4 February 2005 of the Regional Court, Paris 
(Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris) and subsequently by judgment of 28 
June 2006 of the Court of Appeal, Paris (Cour d’appel de Paris). Google ap-
pealed that judgment to the French Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) 
which decided to stay the proceedings and to refer questions to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling.
The second case (C-237/08) deals  with  less  well  known French trade-
marks “Bourse des Vols”, “Bourse des Voyages” and “BDV”, registered for 
travel-arrangement services  by the proprietor  Viaticum.  In this  case  Ad-
Words was used by Viaticums competitors to connect advertisement to Vi-
aticums trademarks in order to advertise competing products. Again, pro-
ceedings  were  brought  against  Google  for  trademark  infringement  and 
Google was found guilty  by judgment of 13 October 2003 by the Regional 
Court,  Nanterre  (Tribunal  de  grande  instance  de  Nanterre).  Google  ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeal, Versailles (Cour d’appel de Versailles) which 
ruled, by judgment of 10 March 2005, that Google had acted as an accessory 
to infringement, and it upheld the judgment by the Regional Court. Google 
finally brought an appeal in cassation against the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal and the French Court of Cassation decided, once again, to stay the 
proceedings and to refer questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
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The third (and last) case (C-238/08) is concerned with the French trade-
mark “Eurochallenges”, registered for, inter alia,  matrimonial agency ser-
vices by the proprietor CNRRH. During 2003 it  was discovered that Ad-
Words was used by competitors to enable users to find information about 
competing products in relation to CNRRHs above mentioned trademarks 
and as a consequence actions was brought before the Regional Court, Nan-
terre.  In  contrast  to  previous  cases  proceedings  were  brought  not  only 
against Google but also against the advertisers, Mr Raboin and Mr Tiger. 
They were all found guilty of trademark infringement by judgment of 14 
December 2004 of the Regional Court, Nanterre, and subsequently, on ap-
peal,  by  judgment  of  23  March 2006 of  the  Court  of  Appeal,  Versailles. 
Google finally brought an appeal in cassation against the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal and the French Court of Cassation, as in the previously 
mentioned cases, stayed the proceedings and referred questions to the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling.
3. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND QUESTIONS
The questions referred to the ECJ relates both to the community trademark 
rules and to the e-commerce rules.  As to the  trademark rules within the 
community, it can first be stated that they to a large extent are harmonized 
by the trademark directive (First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 Decem-
ber 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade-
marks).  Furthermore it  has  been established a community trademark re-
gime governed by the trade mark regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 
40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trademark).1 The directive 
and the regulation are almost identical as to the rules governing scope of 
protection and infringement and I will thus treat them together in the fol-
lowing.
The general idea within the trademark system is that a registered trade-
mark shall  confer  on the  proprietor  exclusive  rights  to  prevent  all  third 
parties not having his/hers consent from using a word corresponding to the 
trademark in the course of trade. This right is  absolute in relation to use 
1 The trademark directive and the community trademark regulation have been replaced by 
subsequent acts. The Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22  October  2008  to  approximate  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  trademarks 
(Codified version), which entered into force on 28 November 2008 and Council Regulation 
(EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trademark (codified version),  
which entered into force on 13 April 2009. However, taking into account the time of the 
national  proceedings,  the  ECJ  is  governing  the  disputes  in  the  main  proceedings  in 
accordance with the previous acts.
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which is identical with the trademark (if there is damage in relation to the 
trademark) but when the use is similar, although not identical, there is an 
additional prerequisite that there should be a likelihood of confusion if the 
trademark proprietor is to be able to prevent the use in question (trademark 
directive art 5(1)a and b and trademark regulation article 9(1)a and b). A 
possibility to prevent use that does not give rise to likelihood of confusion 
exists only in relation to trademarks with a reputation, which means notori-
ously well known trademarks (trademark directive article 5(2) and trade-
mark regulation article 9(1)c).
In the context of the Google-case questions were referred as to the inter-
pretation  of  the  above  mentioned  trademark  rules.  More  precisely,  the 
French court wanted to know whether or not the provider of the AdWords 
service (e.g. Google) is using trademarks in the meaning of article 5(1)(a) 
and (b) of the trademark directive. Furthermore the French Court wanted to 
know if the advertisers’ reservation of keywords in itself constitutes trade-
mark infringement, in situations where the keywords are corresponding to 
trademarks and linked to ads where goods or services are offered for sale 
which reproduces or imitates the goods or services that are offered by the 
trademark proprietor. As regards the questions of relevance for the trade-
mark rules the French Court finally wanted to know if the proprietor may 
oppose the use of AdWords under article 5(2) of the trademark directive 
(article 9(1)(c) of the trademark regulation).
Other questions were referred in  relation to the e-commerce directive 
(Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particu-
lar electronic commerce, in the Internal Market). The Directive provides for 
a harmonized set of rules in relation to information society services and the 
general  idea  is  that  there  should  be  a  common  framework  in  order  to 
provide a full function harmonized internal market. Within the e-commerce 
directive there is a special heading concerned with liability of intermediary 
service providers, chapter II, which specifies certain situations in which an 
intermediary may escape liability. Of relevance for the Google-case is the li-
ability rule in article 14 regarding “hosting” services. This rule states that 
the intermediary is not liable for the information stored at the request of a 
recipient of the service, on condition that the provider: (a) does not have ac-
tual knowledge of illegal activity or information … or (b) upon obtaining 
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such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable ac-
cess to the information.
In relation to this rule the French court wanted to know if a service (like  
AdWords), in the event that there is no primary trademark infringement, 
may be regarded as a service within the meaning of Article 14 of the e-com-
merce directive, so that that service provider can’t incur liability before it 
has received knowledge of the unlawful use of the sign.
4. THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS
In  its  answer  the  ECJ  was  quite  specific.  As  to  the  questions  regarding 
Google’s  responsibility  for  primary  infringement  ECJ found that  Google 
was  not  infringing  trademark rights  by  providing  the  AdWords service. 
Google actually did not, on its own, use trademark in a way relevant for the 
trademark directive, by providing the AdWords service. Consequently it is 
not possible to hold Google responsible for primary infringement. 
As to the responsibility for the advertisers ECJ came up with a less spe-
cific answer. Advertisers are in fact using the keywords that connect to a 
certain ad and therefore it is possible to discuss if the use may constitute in-
fringement. In situations where the keywords corresponds directly to a pro-
tected  trademark,  and  when  the  advertiser  is  advertising  products  that 
match those that are offered under the protected trademark, article 5(1)a of 
the trademark directive is applicable. In addition to use it must be shown 
that there is actual damage in relation to the protected trademark. In this re-
spect the ECJ has developed a quite complicated doctrine of different trade-
mark functions.2 It is sufficient that one function is damaged by the use in 
question to fulfil the prerequisites for an infringement. The final decision as 
to damage in relation to specific trademark functions must be assessed by 
the national court but the ECJ provided some help in its answer by distin-
guishing the function of indicating origin as the most probable to be dam-
aged by use in the AdWords context.3
After  having  decided  that  the  advertiser  might  be  held  liable  for  in-
fringement the last question is to what extent Google might be held liable 
2 As stated in Google,  C-236/08 to C-238/08, para. 77: “Those functions include not only the 
essential function of the trademark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the 
goods  or  services  (‘the  function  of  indicating  origin’),  but  also  its  other  functions,  in 
particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those of 
communication,  investment  or  advertising”.  See  further  Tritton,  G.  2008,  Intellectual 
Property in Europe, Sweet & Maxwell, London, pp. 255–260.
3 Google, C-236/08 to C-238/08, paras 82–90. 
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for contributing to that infringement by providing the AdWords service. In 
this situation the e-commerce directive becomes relevant. In short the ECJ 
found that the AdWords service is  comprised by this  directive and con-
sequently Google can allege that the rules concerned with liability of inter-
mediary service providers are to be applied. Primarily it is relevant to dis-
cuss the applicability of article 14 (e-commerce directive) which deals with 
liability for hosting services.  As the ECJ found that this rule may be applied 
in relation to AdWords, Google may escape liability for contributing to an 
infringement if they comply with the prerequisites in article 14. To put it 
simple, this implies that Google have to act upon knowledge in relation to 
on-going infringements but there is no actual demand in relation to the ser-
vice provider to be proactive, meaning that Google does not have to actively 
police the information (among other things a vast number of different ads) 
that they host.
5. RELATED CASE-LAW
After the Google-case the ECJ have had the opportunity to decide two addi-
tional cases concerning AdWords (so far). Directly after the Google-case, 25 
march 2010, the decision in BergSpechte was delivered (C-278/08). Nothing 
further was added by this case. The questions referred were similar to those 
in the Google-case and the answers directly refer to the findings in Google. 
Another relevant case is Portakabin (C-558/08) which was decided 8 July 
2010. The factual circumstances in Portakabin are, briefly, as follows.  Por-
takabin Ltd manufactures and supplies mobile buildings and is the propri-
etor of the trademark PORTAKABIN. A competing company, Primakabin, 
sells and leases new and second-hand mobile buildings. Apart from manu-
facturing and marketing its own units, Primakabin is also engaged in selling 
and leasing used units, including those manufactured by Portakabin. While 
using  AdWords  Primakabin  connected  it’s  advertising  to,  among  other 
words, the keyword “Portakabin”. In the ad new and used mobile buildings 
were advertised and the word Portakabin appeared as well. On 6 February 
2006, Portakabin brought an action against Primakabin in Amsterdam and 
when the dispute  finally  reached the Supreme Court  of  the Netherlands 
(Hoge Raad der Nederlanden), the Supreme Court decided to stay the pro-
ceedings and to refer a number of questions to the ECJ for a preliminary rul-
ing. 
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One interesting question in  this  case,  which  is  new in relation to the 
questions  asked in  the  Google-case,  relates  to  comparative  advertisement 
and the applicability of article 6 in the trademark directive, regarding limit-
ation of the effects of a trademark. In certain situations the proprietor is not  
entitled to prohibit a third party from using a word that corresponds to a 
protected trademark. One such example is when it is necessary to use the 
trademark  to  indicate  the  intended  purpose  of  a  product  or  service, 
provided that the use is in accordance with honest practices in industrial 
and commercial matters. Another new question relates to the applicability 
of article 7 in the trademark directive and the fact that the proprietor of a 
trademark, as a principle rule, is not entitled to prevent the use of a trade-
mark in relation to goods which have been put on the market within the 
community under the trademark by the proprietor him- or herself. 
In its answers the ECJ to a large extent refers to the  Google-case. How-
ever, as to the questions related to the resale of second-hand goods some 
new answers are provided. Without going into details the ECJ confirms that 
the general perception is that you need to use a trademark in order to in-
form customers as to resale of goods protected under that trademark and 
that you are allowed to do so as long as the goods in question have been put 
on the market by the proprietor of the trademark. It is in “…the interest of 
economic operators and consumers that the sales of second-hand goods via 
the internet should not be unduly restricted…”.4
In summary it might be stated that the development during 2010 is both 
interesting and clarifying. From my, academic, point of view I find it partic-
ularly promising that there are evidence of obvious awareness in both the 
Google-case and the Portakabin-case as to the fact that the Internet and new 
technology occasionally is to be treated with special attention paid to the 
specific preconditions that apply in this “new” environment.5 
4 Portakabin, C-558/08, para. 82.
5 One  example  would  be  the  aforementioned  discussion  about  the  need  to  up-hold  a  
secondary market for the sale of second-hand goods via the Internet (Portakabin, C-558/08, 
para. 83) another example is  the discussion in the  Google-case as to whether or not the 
advertising function of a trademark might be damaged by the use of AdWords. The Court  
states that “when internet users enter the name of a trademark as a search term, the home 
and advertising page of the proprietor of that mark will appear in the list of the natural  
results, usually in one of the highest positions on that list. That display, which is, moreover, 
free of charge,  means that the visibility to internet users of the goods or services of the 
proprietor of the trademark is guaranteed, irrespective of whether or not that proprietor is  
successful in also securing the display, in one of the highest positions, of an ad under the  
heading ‘sponsored links’.” (Google, C-236/08 to C-238/08,  para. 97).
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With that conclusion,  which is  relevant in relation to Internet and in-
formation technology in general, I now choose to focus on my second field 
of interest, the questions that are not asked in the  Google-case (and its fol-
lowers).
6. RELATED QUESTION
The development shown by the Google-case brings forward several general 
questions. To begin with it would be interesting to further investigate the 
preconditions for use of trademarks on the Internet. Issues in relation to this 
has been addressed before, for instance in WIPOs (World Intellectual Prop-
erty  Organization)  “Joint  recommendation  Concerning  Provisions  on the 
Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the 
Internet”,6 but current developments in social and commercial behavior, il-
lustrated by the Google-case (and others), have made it relevant to address 
this issue again. 
Furthermore there are a number of private international law questions 
that  might  be  relevant  to  investigate  both in  relation  to jurisdiction  and 
choice of law. One such example is the question of where the damage oc-
curs when a trademark is infringed by use conducted in new technical con-
texts. This question is relevant when jurisdiction is to be assessed within the 
frames of the Brussels I Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 
22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments  in  civil  and  commercial  matters),  which  in  its  article  5(3) 
provides for jurisdiction in matters relating to torts in the place where the 
action took place or where damage occurred. The question may also be rel-
evant when applicable law is to be ascertained in accordance with the Rome 
II Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual ob-
ligations).
In  order  to  be  able  to  apply  the  aforementioned  regulations  the  in-
fringing action must be defined and located. Those are questions touched 
upon by the court in the Google-case in relation to existing rules within the 
trademark directive and the trademark regulation but the specific question 
to what extent those actions lead to damage in relation to a trademark right 
and, if so, how that damage may be located and territorially demarcated is 
6 See WIPO, publication No 845(E), which is available at www.wipo.int.
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not answered by the ECJ. This latter question is the one I would like to de-
velop here.
7. WHERE DOES DAMAGE OCCUR?
Generally the question of where damage occurs in relation to intellectual 
property  rights  is  answered  with  a  standard  reference  to  the  protecting 
country. The belief is that damage may appear only in the country where 
the intellectual property right is protected, due to the fact that intellectual 
property rights generally are deliminated to the territory of the protecting 
country. There is a strong presumption that this is the appropriate solution 
as to intellectual property rights and it is possible to find support for this 
line of thinking in legal writings since the amendment of the Paris- and Bern 
Conventions at the end of the nineteenth century.7 One of the fundamental 
principles in those conventions is that intellectual property rights are to be 
handled in accordance with the law of the protection country. This prin-
ciple,  although not  expressively  private  international  law oriented,  have 
been used throughout the years to support the idea that intellectual prop-
erty rights shall be handled by courts situated in the protection country, ap-
plying the law of the protecting country. In other words intellectual prop-
erty rights are believed to have a strong connection to one specific country,  
a connection that is stronger in relation to intellectual property rights than 
to other types of property (chattels).
I think that it is time to scrutinize this general perception as to the ques-
tion of locating the damage that is the result of an on-line infringement (as 
illustrated by the Google-case). It is quite clear that the principle of “the pro-
tecting country” still exists and that it affects the decision as to where dam-
age may occur. There is nothing wrong in that. On the contrary, this prin-
ciple still  indicates appropriate solutions in a majority of cases. However, 
there are arguments pointing in favor of a different approach as regards in-
fringement damages, an approach in which the principle of the protecting 
country is not regarded as the absolute and only solution. 
Why is it so that intellectual property rights are supposed to be granted 
special treatment in comparison to other types of property? And why are 
we supposed to up-hold an apprehension in relation to the territoriality of 
7 The Paris Convention of March 20, 1883 and the Bern Convention of September 9, 1886. 
Both conventions are available in full-text at www.wipo.int.
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intellectual  property rights that dates back to the 19th century in today’s 
modern “cyberlaw” society?
It may be added that intellectual property rights throughout history to a 
large extent have been governed on a national basis in accordance with na-
tional law. The strong connection to one single country makes the control of 
this  vulnerable  right  a  state  interest  and  consequently  there  have  been 
voices  in  favor  of  exclusive  national  treatment  in  respect  of  intellectual 
property rights.
However, this argument is no longer valid, at least not within EU. The 
idea to harmonize intellectual property rights was highly prioritized within 
the Community from the start.  There have been a vast number of legislative 
initiatives in this field of law. Today it is fair to say that some areas of intel -
lectual property law are fully harmonized within the EU. That applies to 
trademark law and design law and partly to copyright law. The harmoniza-
tion process has not been equally successful in the area of patent law but 
still it would be wrong to claim that there is something like national intellec-
tual property regimes within the EU. In that context it is strange to up-hold 
the perception that those rights exclusively  must  be monitored and con-
trolled by the protecting country.  Today there is no obvious beneficiary in 
support for such a perception.
One example could illustrate this. It is quite common that infringement 
goes beyond borders and that damage occurs in more than one country. If a 
trademark is protected in several EU-member states there might be damage 
in relation to those rights in more than one country, so called parallel in-
fringements.  In situations like the described It  would be expedient  to be 
able to try all infringements related to the same trademark in one court ap-
plying one single law. 
Applying the law as it is today, it is likely that it will be hard to find jur-
isdiction for all infringements in one court and even if that might be pos-
sible, that court would have to apply a number of different laws in relation 
to infringements in different protecting countries.8 For all parties concerned 
this  may be  regarded as  an unfavorable  solution,  making  the procedure 
more complicated, time-consuming and expensive.
Of course there may be situations in which it is appropriate to apply dif-
ferent laws in relations to different infringements. However, I can’t see why 
8 As to choice of law and intellectual property rights see further Dickinson, A. 2008, The 
Rome II Regulation, Oxford University Press, pp 447–470. 
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this has to be an exclusive rule. If, for instance, the parties to the disputes 
agree that it would be expedient to apply one single law in relation to dif-
ferent infringements, a court should be allowed to respect such an agree-
ment. In relation to choice of law that is not possible today, due to the fact 
that there are limitations as to the party autonomy.9 Is there really a state in-
terest in up-holding absolute protection that prevails over the combined in-
terests of the parties in expedient and efficient procedures? I wouldn’t agree 
to that and consequently I find it relevant to discuss alternatives. 
Such alternative rules may be discussed under the heading of exclusive 
and alternative connecting factors. If the connection to one protection coun-
try is not to be regarded as an exclusive ground for jurisdiction (and choice 
of law) it will be possible to apply alternative solutions. Such solutions may 
be provided by a possibility for the parties to enter into agreement as to 
both jurisdiction and choice of law regarding intellectual property matters.
Within the context of the Internet it may also be relevant to discuss the 
need  for additional domestic connecting factors, going beyond technically 
possible accessibility.10 In such a model one could take into account: inten-
tion, commercial effect, number of times the website have actually been ac-
cessed (and so on). All in all with an ambition to establish a more flexible 
system when it comes to jurisdiction and choice of law; a system that is ac-
curately accommodated to the information society. 
Of course such a modified system must  be well  developed and thor-
oughly investigated. In this paper I have had no such ambition. The ambi-
tion here has been to highlight  the issues  in light of recent development 
shown by the Google-case. There may be disagreement in relation to several 
aspects of my conclusions but I do think that there is consensus in respect of 
the fact that there will be an increased number of infringements related to 
new technology. Google is only one initial example; several others will fol-
low in the years to come. Quite certainly there will be reasons and possibil-
ities to develop the discussion as to jurisdiction and choice of law further.
9 See  for  instance  Rome II  regulation  article  14  and  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  rule  as  to  
registered intellectual property rights in the Brussels I regulation, article 22(4). 
10 This will be further developed in the forthcoming case C-509/09 in which the following 
question has been addressed:  “does  the jurisdiction of  the  courts  of  a  Member State  in 
which  the  operator  of  the  website  is  not  established  require  that  there  be  a  special  
connection between the contested content or the website and the State of the court seized 
(domestic connecting factor) going beyond technically possible accessibility?”
